winter, a large number of outbreaks due to influenza A/H3N2 at longterm care facilities, including higher-than-expected attack rates among vaccinated staff, were reported in some regions of Canada. Interim analysis from the community-based sentinel surveillance system showed circulating H3N2 variants and suboptimal vaccine effectiveness (VE), assessed here for the entire season's data set.
Background. During the 2010-2011 winter, a large number of outbreaks due to influenza A/H3N2 at longterm care facilities, including higher-than-expected attack rates among vaccinated staff, were reported in some regions of Canada. Interim analysis from the community-based sentinel surveillance system showed circulating H3N2 variants and suboptimal vaccine effectiveness (VE), assessed here for the entire season's data set.
Methods. Nasal/nasopharyngeal swabs and epidemiologic details were collected from patients presenting to sentinel sites within 7 days of onset of influenza-like illness. Cases tested positive for influenza by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction; controls tested negative. Odds ratios for medically attended, laboratory-confirmed influenza in vaccinated vs nonvaccinated participants were used to derive adjusted VE. Viruses were characterized by hemagglutination inhibition (HI), and the hemagglutinin genes of a subset were sequenced to explore vaccine relatedness.
Results. Conclusions. Public health observations of increased facility H3N2 outbreaks were consistent with the sentinel network's detection of genetic variants and suboptimal VE but not with conventional HI characterization. We highlight the utility of a multicomponent sentinel surveillance platform that incorporates genotypic, phenotypic, and epidemiologic indicators into the assessment of influenza virus, new variant circulation, vaccine relatedness, and VE.
Since 2004, Canada's sentinel surveillance system has combined annual virologic sampling with vaccine effectiveness (VE) monitoring [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . The platform is predicated on an incident test-negative, case-control design nested within the routine public health surveillance infrastructure. The network supports broad and systematic patient recruitment through an extensive array of several hundred primary care providers linked to public health laboratories and epidemiologists in Canada's 4 largest provinces (British Columbia [BC] , Alberta, Ontario, Quebec), which together are home to >85% of the Canadian population. In comparison with other VE monitoring approaches, including randomized controlled trials, the test-negative design applied to the Canadian surveillance system has proven robust and reliable, with annual VE estimates within the range of recent metaanalyses [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . As a surveillance approach, the platform is efficient and sustainable, permits trend analysis and signal detection, and leverages the input of public health partners for context, interpretation, and action.
During the 2010-2011 influenza season, public health laboratories in Ontario detected an early upswing in A/H3N2 activity. Local public health units also notified provincial epidemiologists of a heightened number of outbreaks at long-term care facilities (LTCFs), including greater-than-expected attack rates among vaccinated staff. This signal of possible vaccine mismatch prompted Ontario to request interim analysis of VE in January 2011 through Canada's community-based sentinel surveillance network. Interim analysis showed significant amino acid (AA) mutations in dominant A/H3N2 isolates and suboptimal VE estimates.
Midseason findings, based on limited sample size, were conveyed to health authorities. At season's end, we used the full sentinel surveillance data set, based on nearly 3-fold more participants, to characterize circulating influenza variants and their impact on VE through genotypic, phenotypic, and epidemiologic measures. Here we summarize VE of the 2010-2011 trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV) during the first postpandemic influenza season in Canada and demonstrate the utility of a multicomponent influenza surveillance platform.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Our methods have been described previously [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Briefly, participating sentinel sites are provided test kits and instructed to offer influenza testing through nasal/nasopharyngeal specimen collection to all patients presenting within 7 days of onset of influenzalike illness (ILI), defined as acute onset of fever and cough and >1 of the following symptoms: sore throat, arthralgia, myalgia, or prostration. Specimens are submitted to provincial public health laboratories for respiratory virus testing. Epidemiologic information is collected from consenting patients at the time of specimen collection using a standardized questionnaire. The approval of institutional ethics boards in each province is obtained.
A patient with a specimen testing positive for any influenza virus is considered a case; patients testing negative for influenza are considered controls. Participants are considered immunized if vaccine was given ≥2 weeks prior to ILI onset; subjects vaccinated <2 weeks prior to ILI onset are excluded but assessed in sensitivity analyses. The VE analysis period for 2010-2011 spanned from 1 November 2010 (week 44) to 30 April 2011 (week 17). The odds ratio (OR) for medically attended, laboratory-confirmed influenza in vaccinated vs nonvaccinated participants was estimated by logistic regression with adjustment for relevant confounders. The VE was calculated as [1 − OR] × 100.
Immunization
Participants received the split (nonadjuvanted) 2010-2011 TIV during the regular fall immunization campaign [13] . In BC and Quebec, the TIV is provided free of charge to individuals at higher risk of influenza-related complications [13] . Others are encouraged to receive the vaccine but must purchase it. The TIV is provided free of charge to all citizens aged ≥6 months in Ontario (since 2000) and Alberta (since 2009). Vaccine status is based on self/parental/guardian report; further detail related to special pediatric dosing requirements is not sought [13] . 
Virus Detection and Characterization
Specimens were tested for influenza A (to subtype) and influenza B at provincial reference laboratories by real-time reversetranscription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) according to provincially determined procedures (Supplementary Data 1, Laboratory Methods). The RT-PCR-positive specimens from across the season were inoculated into cell culture for virus isolation (Supplementary Data 1, Laboratory Methods). An aliquot of each isolate was submitted to the National Microbiology Laboratory for hemagglutination inhibition (HI) characterization, which was performed with post-infection ferret antisera against specific strains using guinea pig erythrocytes for H3 and turkey erythrocytes for H1 and B. Isolates were identified as antigenically most similar to a prototype strain according to the reciprocal of the highest HI titer. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin gene of A/H3N2 isolates spanning the season from each province were undertaken to identify AA substitutions potentially contributing to suboptimal VE [14] . Methods related to sequencing and phylogenetic analysis and corresponding GenBank accession numbers are provided in Supplementary Data (Supplementary Data 2, Hemagglutinin Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis).
RESULTS

Participant Profile
After applying exclusion criteria, 1718 participants contributed to VE analysis for the 2010-2011 season (Supplementary Table 1 ). As in previous years, adults aged 20-49 years comprised the greatest proportion (49%) of sentinel study participants (Table 1 ). The proportion with comorbidity in 2010-2011 was comparable among controls and cases (19% vs 16%) and to previous estimates from the sentinel system (14%-23%) and the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) (15%-20%) [3] [4] [5] [6] 15] .
The proportion of participants vaccinated was 16% among cases and 24% among controls. This latter figure is lower than previous years' reports of control vaccination rates from both (29) 141 (20) 431 (25) British Columbia 162 (16) 99 (14) 261 (15) Ontario 370 (37) 349 (49) 719 (42) Quebec 187 (19) 120 (17) 307 (18) 2010-2011 TIV receipt Any 249 (24) 113 (16) 362 (21) ≥ 2 weeks before ILI onset 212 (21) 103 (15) 315 (18) Specimen collection interval ≤4 days 780 (77) 606 (85) 1386 (81) >4 days 229 (23) 103 (15) 332 (19) Median (range), days 3 (0-7) 3 (0-7) 3 (0-7) 2010-2011 TIV receipt (≥2 weeks before ILI onset) by age 1-8 years 23 (14) 11 (9) 34 (12) 9-19 years 25 (18) 18 (15) 43 (17) 20-49 years 86 (18) 37 (10) 123 (15) 50-64 years 49 (28) 21 (25) 70 (27 [17] .
Influenza Identification
The temporal distribution of influenza detections is shown in Figure 1 . Overall, influenza was detected in 709 of 1718 (41%) participants (Table 2) . Of the 700 influenza viruses characterized, 13% were A(H1N1)pdm09, 58% were A/H3N2, and 28% were influenza B. In the adjacent eastern provinces of Ontario and Quebec, influenza A dominated (approximately 80%), whereas influenza B made a greater contribution in the adjacent western provinces of BC and Alberta (approximately 50%). Influenza A subtype distribution also varied by province, with a greater proportion of H3N2 in Ontario and Quebec (86% and 98%, respectively) but a greater proportion of A(H1N1)pdm09 in BC and Alberta (59% and 33%, respectively) ( Table 2) . Detection of influenza also varied by age (Supplementary Table 2 ). The majority (56%) of influenza B detections were in children <20 years of age, with the highest proportion of specimens positive among schoolchildren 9-19 years of age (28%). Conversely, detection of A/H3N2 was lowest in the 9-19 years age group (16%) and highest in the elderly (31%), with the majority of A/H3N2 detection in adults ≥20 years of age (73%). A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected in <10% of participants across all ages, which is substantially different from sentinel findings during the 2009 fall pandemic wave, when this virus was detected in >50% of those <20 years old, 40% of those 20-49 years of age, 30% of those 50-64 years of age, and 10% of those ≥65 years old. A higher proportion of pandemic detection occurred among adults ≥20 years of age in 2010-2011 (86%) than in 2009 (57%).
Influenza Genetic and Antigenic Characterization
Sufficient virus for HI characterization was isolated from 233 specimens, which were collected mid-November 2010 to the 
Vaccine Effectiveness Estimates
Crude and adjusted VE estimates are shown in Table 3 . There was little change with adjustment for most covariates except age. Fully adjusted VE estimates for any influenza were 37%. The VE estimates by type/subtype were 43% for influenza A, 59% for A (H1N1) pdm09, 39% for A/H3N2, and 25% for influenza B. When restricted to adults aged 20-49 years, the VE estimates were substantially improved for A(H1N1)pdm09 (65%) and influenza B (66%) but not A/H3N2 (39%) ( Table 3) . Point estimates of VE for A/H3N2 were consistently low for young adults with stratification by eastern (39%; 95% confidence interval [CI] , −9% to 66%) and western (41%; 95% CI, −63% to 79%) provinces and in other sensitivity analyses (Table 3) .
With additional adjustment for prior receipt of the 2009 adjuvanted pandemic vaccine, the VE of the 2010-2011 TIV against A(H1N1)pdm09 was reduced (40%; 95% CI, −54% to 76%), including the VE among young adults (25%; 95% CI, −117% to 74%). A category indicator variable based on receipt of 2009 adjuvanted pandemic vaccine alone, 2010-2011 TIV alone, or both vaccines relative to neither was created to explore this relationship. The adjusted VE for prior 2009 adjuvanted pandemic vaccine alone was 69% (95% CI, 38%-85%) overall and 76% (95% CI, 42%-90%) among young adults. Among those who received both the 2009 and 2010 vaccines, the VE was 75% (95% CI, 40%-90%) overall and 82% (95% CI, 40%-95%) among young adults. The VE for 2010-2011 TIV alone was much lower (47%; 95%, CI −136% to 88% overall; and 22%; 95% CI, −270% to 83% among young adults), but confidence intervals were wide. As reported here, interim observations were borne out when the entire season's data set was analyzed. Component-specific estimates of VE for the A/H3N2 strain were low in all age groups, including young adults. In prior seasons during which H3N2-specific VE was similarly derived, point estimates for mismatched strains ranged 40%-60% in the Canadian sentinel system, consistent with our current findings and with findings from recent meta-analysis [2] [3] [4] 12] . Estimates of the 2010-2011 VE for the A/H3N2 component are not yet widely available from elsewhere, but suggestion of suboptimal protection has also been reported in interim estimates from the US military, although not as low as reported here [18] . Public health officials in Canada also reported lower immunization rates among LTCF staff in 2010-2011 compared with 2008-2009 in Ontario (58% vs 77%), Quebec (not available), BC (56% vs 64%) and Alberta (66% vs 69%) but more stable rates among LTCF residents (93% in Ontario, 84% in Quebec, 90% in BC, and 90% in Alberta). A combination of reduced vaccine coverage and low VE may account for the increase in outbreaks at LTCFs where H3N2 viruses dominated in 2010-2011.
Despite meeting genetic variation criteria for possible antigenic drift [14] , neither the A/Victoria/208/2009 variant nor the A/ Hong Kong/2121/2010 H3N2 variant met conventional HI criteria to be considered antigenically distinct from the vaccine [19] . This is consistent with WHO conclusions, based on postinfection ferret antisera and vaccine immunogenicity trials [20, 21] but is inconsistent with our observations based on phylogenetic and epidemiologic analysis as well as public health field experience. In vitro assessment of vaccine match based on postinfection ferret antisera may not accurately predict protection in humans, whose prior infection-or vaccine-induced immunity is likely to be more complex and to influence-positively or negatively-current vaccine protection [22] . There are also recognized issues in the use of human vaccine immunogenicity findings to predict vaccine protection [23] . If provided as timely, reliable, and representative estimates, the incorporation of epidemiologic VE measures could enhance the process of vaccine strain selection, and systems to achieve this warrant further evaluation and development.
Our sentinel system findings and previous commentary by others [24] of global virus circulation or to the field isolates selected for vaccine-relatedness or immunogenicity analysis in support of subsequent vaccine strain selection [20, 21] . Although seasonal influenza strains dominated the 2010-2011 postpandemic season, a shift in the age distribution of pandemic detections toward adults was observed in the Canadian sentinel surveillance system. Such a shift had been predicted based on historic postpandemic observations [26] , mathematical modeling [27] , and sero-prevalence surveys [28] and was also reported by the UK Severe Influenza Surveillance System in 2010-2011 [29] . We additionally found that adults comprised the majority of sentinel A/H3N2 detections and had higher rates of positivity than schoolchildren. Heterosubtypic cross-immunity between A/H3N2 and pandemic A/ H1N1 viruses has been observed experimentally, attributed to cross-protective T-cell responses [30] . The extent to which the substantial 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic affecting primarily young people may have also influenced the profile of A/H3N2 risk is intriguing to consider but remains speculative.
Whereas a monovalent AS03-adjuvanted pandemic vaccine was used for the 2009 immunization campaign in Canada, there was a return to the conventional nonadjuvanted TIV for 2010-2011. In 2009, adjuvanted pandemic VE estimates were consistently >85% in children and young adults, as measured through the sentinel system (93%) [6] and elsewhere [31] [32] [33] . Despite a vaccine that was still considered well matched to the circulating pandemic strain in 2010 [20, 21] , our sentinel system estimated lower VE for that component (59% overall; 65% among young adults) compared with 2009 [6] . Our 2010-2011 A(H1N1) pdm09 estimate is comparable with or slightly higher than interim 2010-2011 VE estimates reported from the United Kingdom (51%) [34] , Spain (49%) [35] , and in a pooled analysis of 7 European countries (35%) [36] . These latter studies accounted for 2009 pandemic vaccine receipt; when we adjusted for that, we also observed a reduction in A(H1N1)pdm09 VE estimates. In further exploration, the adjuvanted vaccine administered in Canada in 2009 appeared to provide substantial protective effects >1 year later, whereas sentinel study participants given the 2010-2011 TIV alone appeared to derive less benefit.
Influenza B showed the expected profile of greater positivity among children [37] , and we observed a moderate VE of 66% in adults and a lower VE in children and older adults. Variability in VE estimates for influenza B has previously been recognized [2] [3] [4] . The alternate B/Yamagata-lineage virus was a minor contributor to sentinel surveillance detections and is unlikely to have substantially influenced suboptimal VE. However, lower immunogenicity to the 2010-2011 B/Brisbane/60/08(Victoria)-like antigen in young children primed with Yamagata-lineage antigen has recently been reported, and variable responses to the 2010-2011 influenza B component have also been shown in older children, based on prior immunization history [38, 39] . Young adults with greater cumulative experience and boosting to both influenza B lineages may achieve higher vaccine protection, but the reasons for variability in influenza B VE overall require better understanding and evaluation.
The limitations and strengths of our approach have been described previously [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Results are based primarily on the participation of working-age adults, and generalization to other age groups requires caution. In Canada, universal healthcare coverage addresses barriers to access that may exist in other countries, and the unrestricted offer of participation to all patients presenting to a sentinel site within 7 days of ILI onset helps to standardize in part for healthcare-seeking behavior. We also standardize for illness presentation and severity by including only those meeting a specified ILI definition. Although patient and clinician discretion is incorporated into the decision to test, the sentinel approach enables greater consistency (for example, in the likelihood of being ill with influenza) than other test-negative designs based on general laboratory submissions. Vaccine status in this study was self-reported but collected at the time of specimen submission, before the test result was known, minimizing differential recall bias. Studies in other settings have reported consistency between self-reported and registry-based influenza vaccine status, but we have not specifically assessed this in our system [40] . Component-specific analyses need substantial sample size for adequate precision, and this requires ongoing effort to enhance participation; we draw attention to wide confidence intervals, particularly for influenza B and in other stratified analyses, precluding definitive conclusions. Although we have scrutinized vaccine relatedness through gene sequencing and HI characterization of sentinel viruses from across the season, this ultimately represents only a proportion of all influenza detections. We cannot rule out systematic differences in viruses available for characterization-an issue for all laboratory-based influenza surveillance. Our estimates reflect vaccine performance in the context of a given mix of vaccine-related and variant strains detected in the source population; overall VE results may not be generalizable to other regions with a different mix of viruses. We have illustrated how a complete package of surveillance observations, including molecular findings, can inform vaccine assessment, but further work is needed to strengthen that surveillance infrastructure and to correlate genetic/AA changes with impact on antigenicity, immunogenicity, and vaccine effectiveness. Finally as with any observational design, even with careful attention to measured and potentially important confounders and comparison against expected community profiles, we cannot rule out residual bias and confounding. We emphasize that our system is a surveillance approach intended for trend analysis and signal detection and for interpretation in the context of other indicators.
With further refinement to understand methodologic issues and expansion to include more regions, the surveillance system we describe-harnessing genotypic, phenotypic, and epidemiologic indicators-could help inform influenza virus evolution and annual vaccine protection. Differences across genotypic and phenotypic indicators may also point to opportunities for further immuno-epidemiologic evaluation and understanding. We thus encourage the development of linked sentinel surveillance networks as a core public health platform to monitor influenza virus, new variant circulation, vaccine-relatedness, and VE.
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